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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-2222
___________
CARLOS TURCIOS-OCAMPO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A96 047 136)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 1, 2010
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  May 26, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Carlos Turcios-Ocampo petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying
     Turcios-Ocampo was also charged with being subject to removal because he sought1
or had sought to procure a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States
by fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact.  Turcios-Ocampo did not concede
that he is removable on this basis.
2
his applications for relief from removal.  We will deny the petition for review.
Turcios-Ocampo is a native and citizen of Honduras who has lived in the United
States since 1988.  In 2006, when Turcios-Ocampo was returning to the United States
from Mexico, immigration officers interviewed him due to concerns with his
documentation.  Immigration proceedings were initiated and Turcios-Ocampo conceded
that he is subject to removal because he did not have a valid entry document at the time he
applied for admission to the United States.   Turcios-Ocampo applied for asylum,1
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”),
asserting a fear of persecution on account of his political opinion.  Turcios-Ocampo also
prepared an application for cancellation of removal, which the IJ found untimely and
pretermitted.  
Turcios-Ocampo testified that in 1986, while attending college in Honduras, he
visited the United States several times to do translation work for United States officials. 
Turcios-Ocampo also joined a right-wing democratic group, the Frente Unido
Universitario Democratico (“FUUD”), which opposed the leftist group, Frente de
Reforma Universitaria (“FRU”).  At this time, Turcios-Ocampo also worked at a hotel. 
He met a hotel guest named Mr. Lamb, who Turcios-Ocampo believed was promoting
3democracy in the region.  Lamb hired Turcios-Ocampo to translate communications. 
Turcios-Ocampo testified that he is afraid to return to Honduras now because of
the rise of powerful drug lords and gang members, who were FRU members and maintain
their political views.  Turcios-Ocampo explained that in 1996 he returned to his home
town and members of a family named Nunez, who opposed the FUUD, threatened him
and told him to return to the United States.  Turcios-Ocampo stated that Nunez family
members threatened the lives of his family members and stoned his uncle’s house in
Honduras.  Turcios-Ocampo left the country immediately after receiving these threats.
Turcios-Ocampo believes that he was threatened because of his translation work in
the 1980's.  He explained that he was a friend of Jorge Nunez, who told his relatives about
his work.  Turcios-Ocampo stated that since 1996 the threats have continued against other
family members in Honduras and that the most recent threat was in 2005 when young
males tore down a fence his uncle was building on his property.  He also stated that he
knew someone who worked for the United States government who was killed when he
returned to Honduras in 2005.  Turcios-Ocampo does not believe that he would be safe in
any part of Honduras because the drug dealers have connections all over the country.  On
cross-examination, Turcios-Ocampo conceded that, despite the threats made against him
in 1996, he had returned to Honduras approximately ten times, although he did not return
to his home town.  Turcios-Ocampo also conceded that he did not apply for asylum after
the 1996 or 2005 threats.
     The IJ also denied Turcios-Ocampo’s CAT application.  This ruling is not at issue.2
4
The IJ concluded that Turcios-Ocampo had not met his burden of proof for asylum
or withholding of removal.  The IJ explained that Turcios-Ocampo had not submitted any
evidence corroborating his testimony.  The IJ also stated that any verbal threats did not
rise to the level of persecution and that his numerous visits to Honduras belied his claim
that the entire country is dangerous to him.  The IJ also questioned whether the Nunez
family would still want to harm Turcios-Ocampo.  The IJ further found no proof that the
Nunez family is a group that the government is unable or unwilling to control.2
On appeal, the BIA held that the IJ did not err in finding that Turcios-Ocampo
failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum and withholding of removal.  The BIA
agreed with the IJ that the threats and stoning of his uncle’s house did not rise to the level
of persecution.  The BIA also noted that Turcios-Ocampo did not report any incidents of
harm to authorities and that the IJ had found that he did not show that the harm he
suffered was inflicted by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control. 
The BIA also stated that Turcios-Ocampo did not show that he was unable to relocate to
another part of Honduras, noting that he had returned to Honduras without suffering any
harm.  The BIA further held that the IJ did not err in noting Turcios-Ocampo’s failure to
submit corroborative evidence. 
Turcios-Ocampo also unsuccessfully challenged on appeal the IJ’s decision to
pretermit his application for cancellation for removal.  Noting that the regulations allow a
5judge to set time limits for the filing of applications and related documents, the BIA
explained that the IJ told the parties at a hearing on January 25, 2007, that all applications
had to be filed ten days before the September 18, 2007, merits hearing, but Turcios-
Ocampo presented his cancellation application and supporting documentation at the
merits hearing.  The BIA also rejected Turcios-Ocampo’s related due process claim.  This
petition for review followed.
Turcios-Ocampo argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s decision to
pretermit his cancellation of removal application.  Turcios-Ocampo asserts that he
appeared at the January 25, 2007, hearing with his application, but the IJ did not stamp
the application into evidence because he had yet to pay the filing fee.  Turcios-Ocampo
states that he paid the fee more than a month before his September 18, 2007, hearing date,
but the fee receipt was not received until after the hearing.  Because he had not received
the receipt and was thus unable to get the necessary fingerprints, Turcios-Ocampo states
that on September 12, 2007, he sought an adjournment of his upcoming hearing, but the IJ
denied his motion.  Turcios-Ocampo recognizes that the IJ also found that he had not
timely filed his supporting documents, but argues that the regulations do not state that a
failure to file documents or obtain a fee receipt will result in the waiver of an otherwise
timely application.  Turcios-Ocampo contends that the IJ’s refusal to entertain his
application violated his right to due process.
The administrative record reflects that Turcios-Ocampo’s counsel stated he did not
     Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(b), an application requiring the payment of a fee must be3
accompanied by a fee receipt from the Department of Homeland Security or by an
application for a waiver of fees when filed in the Immigration Court.
6
have his applications for relief ready at a hearing held on July 13, 2006.  The IJ told
counsel to bring them to the next hearing or they would be considered abandoned.  The IJ
stated that fingerprinting had to be done and the fee had to be paid.   The next hearing3
was held six months later on January 25, 2007.  Counsel stated that he had a “bare-bones”
cancellation application, but he did not have the supporting documents or fee receipt.  The
IJ advised Turcios-Ocampo that he would enforce the court’s ten-day rule, requiring that
all submissions be made at least ten days before the hearing. 
On the day of the merits hearing on September 18, 2007, Turcios-Ocampo’s
lawyer told the IJ that, as a result of an error in his office, he had just sent in the
application fee and fingerprinting fee.  Counsel brought to the hearing the cancellation
application and supporting documents, which the IJ stated he would not consider because
he had not complied with the ten-day rule.  The IJ asked counsel why he was providing
the application on the day of the hearing and counsel replied, “... I thought it was filed.  I
thought everything was done.”  A.R. at 81. 
Based on these facts, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the IJ
did not err in pretermitting the cancellation application.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c)
(authorizing the Immigration Judge to set time limits for the filing of applications and
related documents and to deem waived the opportunity to file an application or document
7not filed within the time set); see also Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir.
2008) (reviewing application of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) for abuse of discretion); Khan v.
Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2006) (denial of a continuance reviewed for abuse
of discretion is not disturbed unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law”).
Although Turcios-Ocampo states that he timely filed his cancellation application but not
his supporting documents, the record does not reflect that Turcios-Ocampo complied with
the court’s ten-day rule.  We also agree with the Government that Turcios-Ocampo does
not have a cognizable due process claim because he has no constitutionally protected
interest in the discretionary relief of cancellation of removal.  See, e.g, Pinos-Gonzalez v.
Mukasey, 519 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding same); see also United States v.
Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding aliens do not have a due process
interest in being considered for discretionary relief); Pinho v. I.N.S., 249 F.3d 183, 189
(3d Cir. 2001) (holding change in eligibility criteria for suspension of deportation, a
discretionary form of relief, did not implicate due process rights).
Turcios-Ocampo also challenges the denial of his applications for asylum and
withholding of removal.  We review the agency’s findings under a substantial evidence
standard, which requires that we uphold the agency’s findings unless the evidence
compels a contrary conclusion.  Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Turcios-Ocampo contends that he established that the threats to himself and his family
constituted past persecution and that the Government did not rebut the presumption of
8future persecution.  The BIA, however, concluded that the verbal threats against Turcios-
Ocampo and his family and the stoning of his uncle’s house did not rise to the level of
persecution.  See Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating persecution
requires threats to life so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom).  Turcios-
Ocampo points to no evidence compelling a contrary conclusion.  Because Turcios-
Ocampo did not establish past persecution, a presumption of future persecution does not
apply. 
Turcios-Ocampo also challenges the IJ’s characterization of his claim as “stale”
because he testified to events that occurred more than twenty years ago.  The BIA,
however, did not mention staleness as a reason for concluding that Turcios-Ocampo
failed to meet his burden of proof.  Where, as here, the BIA offered its own analysis and
did not adopt all of the IJ’s findings, we review the BIA’s decision, not the decision of the
IJ.  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir. 2005).
Finally, Turcios-Ocampo disputes that he can move to a part of Honduras outside
his home town.  He contends that, although he has visited Honduras, these business trips
were only for one or two weeks at a time.  He argues that Honduras is a small country and
that he would be discovered if he remained for a long time.  Turcios-Ocampo has not
shown that the evidence compels the conclusion that he cannot move to another part of
Honduras.  We agree with the Government that his numerous trips to Honduras run
     The BIA erred in citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(B) to support the conclusion that4
Turcios-Campos failed to show that he could not relocate to another part of Honduras. 
This subsection applies where an alien has established past persecution.  The BIA may
have intended to cite § 1208.16(b)(2), which applies to future threats of persecution.  In
any event, the BIA’s recognition of the fact that Turcios-Campos had returned to
Honduras supports its conclusion that he did not establish a well-founded fear of
persecution.  
counter to a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution.4
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
